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Abstract
The public controversy over genetically modiﬁed [GM] crops is predominantly
framed in terms of health and safety risks to humans and the environment. However,
opponents of GM crops are motivated by a wide variety of other social, political, and
economic concerns. In this paper, I critically assess the predominance of the health
and safety framing in terms of Iris Young’s model of communicative democracy. I
argue that the health and safety framing leads to the marginalization of the social,
political, and economic concerns of GM opponents, within both public discourse and
government, and is therefore democratically illegitimate.
1. Introduction
The public controversy over genetically modiﬁed [GM] crops is predominantly
framed in terms of concerns over HEALTH AND SAFETY (Irwin 1995, ch. 2; Middendorf
et al. 1998; Lang, O’Neill, and Hallman 2003; Cook, Pieri, and Robbins 2004;
Demortain 2013). Within this framing, the primary point of controversy is whether
GM foods are likely to cause bio-physiological injury or disease to human consumers;
a secondary issue, but one that still ﬁts within the health and safety framing, is
whether the cultivation of GM crops is likely to cause bio-physiological injury or
disease to nontarget species (that is, animals and plants that are not targeted as
agricultural pests) or ecosystems more broadly. Proponents of the development and
use of GM crops argue that “science says” that GM crops are safe. But opponents
remain skeptical — perhaps even “irrationally” skeptical, in the face of what “science
says.”
This health and safety framing omits many other kinds of arguments or concerns
on both sides of the controversy. On the one hand, GM proponents frequently oﬀer
“feed the world” arguments in support of agricultural biotechnology. According to
Thanks to Kelly Bronson, Eric Kennedy, participants at the 2015 conference on Values in Medicine,
Science, and Technology at the University of Texas at Dallas, and members of the philosophy department
at Georgetown University for their feedback on earlier versions of this paper. All opinions expressed
in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reﬂect the views and policies of any other
organization or entity.
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these arguments, biotechnology is useful — perhaps even necessary — to increase
global food production and promote food security. “Feed the world” arguments are
considered so important that an agricultural biotechnology industry organization
“communicator’s guide” identiﬁes feeding the world as one of its four “key messages”
(Food Biotechnology 2013; for critical discussion of these arguments, see Lacey 2002;
Hicks 2015).
On the other hand, GM opponents frequently raise a variety of legal, political,
economic, and cultural concerns about GM crops. In the 1980s and 1990s, when
agricultural biotechnology was ﬁrst being developed, analysts raised concerns that
it would exacerbate inequalities between farmers and large agricultural chemical
companies (Goldburg et al. 1990, especially 39ﬀ) or between developed and developing
countries (Busch et al. 1991), and that recombinant bovine growth hormone [rBGH], the
ﬁrst major use of biotechnology in food production, would accelerate consolidation
in the dairy industry (Burkhardt 1992). These analysts also raised concerns about the
downstream eﬀects of increased inequality and consolidation on rural communities,
such as accelerating rural depopulation. More recently, some analysts have argued
that strong intellectual property rights for GM plants have indeed contributed to
consolidation among plant biotechnology ﬁrms, giving them increased power over
farmers (Marco and Rausser 2008; Howard 2009; James, Hendrickson, and Howard
2013). In 2009, a group of entomologists raised concerns that licensing agreements
required to purchase GM seeds were restricting independent research on the plants
(Sappington et al. 2010; Biddle 2014; Glenna et al. 2015). Other analysts raise concerns
about the coexistence of organic and GM agriculture (Hubbard and Hassanein 2012),
or whether the development trajectory of agricultural biotechnology means that it
cannot be used in more sustainable systems of food production (Ervin, Glenna, and
Jussaume 2010). Today, the Center for Food Safety, an anti-GM advocacy organization,
argues that the international agricultural biotechnology ﬁrm Monsanto protects its
intellectual property using “aggressive physical and emotional tactics” against farmers
(as summarized by Ma 2012, 702). Brandt points out that Zapatista communities in
southern Mexico link indigenous cultural and economic concerns in their opposition
to GM crops: “Drawing on their cultural identity as ‘people made of corn,’ members
of Zapatista communities described the transgenic contamination as an instrument of
oppression invaders used to destroy the people by destroying their corn” (Brandt 2014,
883). And, in an ethnography of canola farmers in Saskatchewan, Bronson identiﬁes
concerns about, among other things, “the ways in which community relationships
change under corporate seed contracts,” “a lack of public deliberation about regulatory
decisions,” and a controversy over the relevance of farmers’ agronomic expertise in a
major lawsuit (Bronson 2014, 528ﬀ).
Reviewing the variety of concerns raised by GM opponents, some observers
of the controversy argue that it is a proxy or ﬂashpoint for a more fundamental
disagreement between what rural sociologists call THE CORPORATE FOOD REGIME and
THE FOOD SOVEREIGNTY REGIME. (For the main point, see especially Sagar, Daemmrich,
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and Ashiya 2000; Nestle 2010; Johnson 2014; Thompson 2014; for the general concept
of food regimes, see Friedmann 1993, 2005; McMichael 2005.) Consequently, I refer to
the range of legal, political, economic, and cultural concerns raised by GM opponents
as FOOD REGIME CONCERNS.
It is plausible that there are strong causal links between certain food regime and
health and safety concerns. Chronic economic insecurity can limit access to health
care, while chronic health problems can cause economic insecurity. Thus, if GM
crops are exacerbating economic inequality and insecurity in some rural communities,
then it’s plausible that this is further exacerbating chronic health problems in these
communities. But a link between food regime concerns and health and safety concerns
does not mean that the former can be reduced to the latter. First, some concerns —
such as research restrictions or industry consolidation — do not have an obvious or
strong connection to health or safety. Second, on the health and safety framing, a
paradigm putative causal chain linking a GM crop to an adverse health outcome is a
chemico-physiological mechanism that begins when a molecule comes into contact
with an organism and interacts with it on a cellular or sub-cellular level (compare
Ankley et al. 2010, Fig. 1). This paradigm— investigated using what Lacey (1999, 2015)
calls “materialist” or “decontextualizing” research strategies — cannot accommodate
the socio-economic and cultural mechanisms that link food regime and health and
safety concerns. Thus, a complete understanding of food regime and health and
safety concerns would require thinking about both kinds of concerns together.1
In this paper, I direct critical attention to the predominance of the health and
safety framing — the way in which the controversy is understood as being about
health and safety concerns, as per the opening paragraph — in both public and
regulatory contexts. I argue that, while the predominance of the health and safety
framing may appear democratic, it is actually democratically illegitimate. On the one
hand, the predominance of this framing appears to be supported by arguments for
“public reason,” shared assumptions and conceptual frameworks for decisionmaking
in a pluralist society. However, I show that the predominance of this framing leads
to the marginalization of food regime concerns, and thus GM opponents who hold
these concerns. My argument draws heavily on the work of political philosopher Iris
Young; to borrow from her, the GM controversy is a case in which “political processes
…claim to be democratic but which some people reasonably claim are dominated by
only some of those whose interests are aﬀected by them” (Young 2000, 13).
I proceed as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of Young’s account of deliberative
or communicative democracy. Section 3 discusses the role of expertise in the health
and safety framing, and section 4 examines ways in which the health and safety
framing eﬀectively excludes food regime concerns — and thus people who have
such concerns — from public discourse about GM crops. Taken together, these
1. Thanks to Claudia Murphy for pressing me to make this point.
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three sections imply that the health and safety framing of the GM controversy is
democratically illegitimate. Next, in section 5, I examine US domestic regulatory
institutions, showing how the health and safety framing is institutionalized in the
regulatory framework governing GM crops. This suggests an institutional explanation
for the predominance of the framing in public discourse: the health and safety framing
is predominant at the public level because it is institutionalized at the governmental
level. Finally, in section 6, I combine this institutional explanation with the analysis
of sections 2-4 to argue that the predominance of the health and safety framing at
the governmental level is doubly illegitimate.
Given the need to lay out a signiﬁcant amount of background information and
theoretical machinery, for the sake of space this paper focuses almost entirely on the
US context. Kleinman, Kinchy, and Autry (2009) examine agricultural biotechnology
policy in the US, Kenya, EU, Austria, China, and India, and ﬁnd both similarities
and diﬀerences. Speciﬁcally, every political context uses some version of “science-
based” policymaking; but Kenya, the EU, and Austria also recognize a role for “social
values-based” policy. That is, in my terminology, health and safety concerns are
recognized in all six contexts, but some contexts — unlike the US — also recognize
food regime concerns. Descriptively, my institutional explanation predicts that, in
contexts where regulatory authorities recognize and respect food regime concerns, the
health and safety framing will not be so predominant in public discourse. (Note that
this prediction by itself does not test my institutional explanation.) Further, insofar
as GM opponents are not marginalized at either the policy or governmental level
in these policy contexts, my normative point does not apply: the GM controversy
is more democratically legitimate in these contexts (at least in this speciﬁc respect).
Future empirical research could carry out the kind of international comparison that I
simply do not have room for here, and indeed thereby empirically test the institutional
explanation that I can merely propose here.
In this paper, I do not discuss either the content and (epistemic) justiﬁability
of any health, safety, or food regime concerns. In this respect, my paper does not
aim to provide a review of food regime concerns (for such reviews, see Lacy 2002;
Thompson and Hannah 2008; Hicks and Millstein 2016). My concern here is not
with whether GM crops are actually safe or pose a threat to human health; similarly, I
am not directly concerned here with whether GM crops actually have greater yields
than their conventional counterparts (on this, see Hicks 2015), contribute to farm
consolidation, or exacerbate economic inequality. I also assume, rather than argue,
that some GM opponents hold and attempt to raise food regime concerns — I take it
that the literature cited above supports that empirical claim. Rather, my aim here is
to show how these food regime concerns — and, by extension, the people who hold
them — are eﬀectively excluded from both public and governmental deliberation,
and to argue that this exclusion is democratically illegitimate.2
2. Thanks to Kelly Bronson and Eric Kennedy for pressing me to clarify the aims of my project.
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Given this aim, my project here resembles three prior analyses of biotechnology
governance:
(1) Wright’s analysis of the way the design of the Asilomar Conference on Recombi-
nant DNA in 1975 “marginalized social and ethical questions regarding genetic
engineering, making it impossible to achieve their sustained consideration”
(Wright 1994, 447; see also Krimsky 1982, 99; cited by Kleinman and Kinchy
2003, 384);
(2) Kleinman and Kinchy’s argument that “those who oppose …[a] technology
because of the expected undesirable social eﬀects or moral/ethical concerns
gain legitimate entry into the debate only when they focus on issues, such as
the environment, health and safety, that are widely understood to be matters
for scientiﬁc evaluation” (Kleinman and Kinchy 2003, 380); and
(3) Parthasarathy’s recent work on the exclusion of “ethical” concerns from US
patent politics (Parthasarathy 2011).
Speciﬁcally, like Wright and Kleinman and Kinchy, my analysis here examines both
discursive and institutional or organization politics; but this paper complements or
goes beyond these preceding analyses in several ways. First, while these previous
analyses often (though not always) leave their normative conclusions implicit or lightly
theorized, I draw on a robust account of deliberative democracy to make an explicitly
normative point. Second, Wright focuses primarily on the ways a subset of health
and safety concerns — especially hazards to lab workers — were marginalized in the
early days of biotechnology governance. By contrast, I focus on the contemporary
marginalization of a diﬀerent category of concerns. Third, Kleinman and Kinchy’s
analysis of rBGH politics in the US focuses on legislative debates (Kleinman and
Kinchy 2003, 11ﬀ), with only a single paragraph discussing the FDA (Kleinman and
Kinchy 2003, 16). However, as I discuss in more detail in section 5, US biotechnology
policy is primarily based on a White House memo, which grounded agencies’ authority
to regulate biotechnology in pre-existing legislation. Thus, my focus on the executive
branch agencies provides a better perspective on how political institutions have
shaped public discursive GM politics in the US (thereby developing a point made by
Thompson 2014).
2. Young on Communicative Democracy
In Inclusion and Democracy, Young distinguishes her model of democracy from two
others. First is AGGREGATIVE DEMOCRACY, which “interprets democracy as a process of
aggregating the preferences of citizens in choosing public oﬃcials and policies” (Young
2000, 19). Vote-counting, without assuming any form of discussion or collective
deliberation, is a paradigm of aggregative democracy. By contrast, deliberative
democracy “associate[s] democracy with open discussion and the exchange of views
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leading to agreed-upon policies” (Young 2000, 22). In other words, for deliberative
democrats, democracy is characterized by public political deliberation.
Young considers herself a deliberative democrat, but distinguishes her model from
“narrower” models. Major examples of narrow deliberative democrats, as identiﬁed by
Young, seem to include Joshua Cohen, Jane Mansbridge, Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, and Habermas (at least sometimes) (Young 2000, 22n13); more recent
major examples would probably include Cheryl Misak and Raymond Talisse (Misak
2000; Talisse 2009; see also MacGilvray 2013; Misak and Talisse 2014).3
The principal diﬀerence between narrow deliberative democrats and Young is her
emphasis on emotionality, power relations — speciﬁcally, the ways in which power
relations within a deliberative democratic process reﬂect and reinforce power relations
within the broader social context — and indeed the connection between emotionality
and power. Young argues that narrow deliberative democrats understand deliberation
strictly in terms of the dispassionate exchange of arguments (Young 2000, 36-51).
Young talks about her view in terms of “reasonable persuasion and judgment” (Young
2000, 39); while the semantic diﬀerence is subtle, she clearly wants room in her model
for emotionally laden personal narratives, protest marches, and perhaps sometimes
even angry denunciations.
Young articulates her model of deliberative democracy with a set of “normative
ideals” (Young 2000, 23-5). For my purposes here, we can paraphrase these ideals
into the following criterion of legitimacy:
A democratic decision is normatively legitimate only if all those who
are aﬀected by it have an equal eﬀective opportunity to participate
in a public process of discussion, deliberation, and decision-making,
including eﬀective opportunities to present one’s views, question or
challenge the views of others, and have one’s questions or challenges
answered.
Young argues that narrow models of deliberative democracy eﬀectively deny less-
privileged groups opportunities for equal participation, and thus fail the test of
legitimacy. Insofar as privileged groups regard the rhetoric of less-privileged groups
as emotional and irrational, narrow deliberative democracy’s norm of dispassionate
exchange seems to justify marginalizing and ignoring them. A group of protestors on
3. Young’s view is also distinct from that of HYPOTHETICAL DEMOCRATS, who deploy thought experi-
ments about hypothetical, usually highly idealized, deliberators. Examples of hypothetical democrats
include Rawls and other (though not all) contractarians, Habermas (sometimes), and philosopher of
science Philip Kitcher (2011a, 2011b). The approach advocated by Bryan Norton in his Sustainability
falls somewhere between hypothetical and narrow deliberative democracy, perhaps under the inﬂuence
of Habermas: a model of hypothetical, ideal deliberation is used to suggest norms and design elements
for actual deliberative processes (Norton 2005, especially 277ﬀ).
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the sidewalk is merely an angry mob, venting their emotions in an inarticulate cry;
but angry mobs and inarticulate cries do not need to be included in the dispassionate
exchange of arguments; and thus the protestors may be ignored. Indeed, including an
angry mob would likely disrupt the dispassionate exchange of arguments, and thus
on the narrow deliberative democratic view the protestors should be ignored. In this
way, Young argues, narrow views of deliberative democracy reproduce existing forms
of domination, oppression, and marginalization within deliberative fora. Thus narrow
deliberative democracy fails to satisfy the criterion for legitimacy. To distinguish her
model from narrow versions, Young sometimes calls it COMMUNICATIVE DEMOCRACY.
As the example in the last paragraph suggests, much of Young’s analysis in
Inclusion and Democracy focuses on rhetorical styles, or the form of communication:
which styles of communication (modes, media, dialects, emotionality) are included or
not in particular communicative contexts. Here I am more interested in the content
of communication: which kinds of concerns and evidence are included or not.
Young goes on to distinguish two ways in which groups can be eﬀectively de-
nied equal opportunity to participate in deliberation, and thus two ways in which
deliberation can fail to be legitimate. DE JURE, EXPLICIT, or what Young calls EXTERNAL
EXCLUSIONS are the most obvious and familiar; these occur when a group is literally
excluded from the deliberative forum, as when literacy tests and poll taxes were
used to exclude Blacks from voting under Jim Crow (Young 2000, 53-4). DE FACTO,
IMPLICIT, or what Young calls INTERNAL EXCLUSIONS are more subtle. These occur
when a group is nominally included, yet “lack[s] eﬀective opportunity to inﬂuence
the thinking of others” (Young 2000, 55-7). Young’s critique of narrow deliberative
democracy argues that narrow deliberative democracy creates implicit exclusions,
even when it is explicitly inclusive: less-privileged groups can be nominally included
in the deliberative process — they can be permitted to make statements at a town
hall meeting, for example — and yet eﬀectively excluded — when their rhetoric is
regarded as emotional and irrational and hence ignored when the ﬁnal decision is
made.
It might be argued that Young’s model is inappropriate to national-level gover-
nance in the US. That is, it might be thought that deliberative democracy is appropriate
for neighborhoods and small towns, but unworkable for polities with hundreds of
millions of inhabitants. Governing a polity as large as the US requires political
representation; either Young’s conception of legitimacy is utopian (and so irrelevant)
or the US federal government as such is illegitimate (and so the conclusion of the last
paragraph could have been reached much more directly).4
However, this objection may confuse deliberative democracy with direct democ-
racy, and overlooks existing institutions for public deliberation within the US federal
4. I thank Mark Lance for suggesting a version of this objection.
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government. Young (2000, ch. 4) — along with Henry Richardson (2002) and Mark
Brown (2009) — argues that mass politics requires institutions for both representation
and deliberation, and indeed the ﬂow of information between representative and
deliberative institutions. Representatives — whether they are elected oﬃcials, political
appointees, or career employees in regulatory agencies — must be informed about the
concerns and interests of their constituents in order to make decisions that address
those concerns and promote those interests. This is only possible insofar as citizens
have eﬀective opportunities to explain and debate their concerns and interests in pub-
lic fora — that is, insofar as there are inclusive institutions for public deliberation. In
the US federal government, advisory committees, public meetings with open comment
periods, and opportunities for public comments on new regulations are all signiﬁcant
deliberative institutions, albeit ones that are often dominated by commercial interests.
Young’s criterion of legitimacy does not require that every individual component
institution of the federal government be a forum for public deliberation. Rather, it
requires inclusive public deliberation, mechanisms that connect public and govern-
mental deliberation, and that government authorities be appropriately responsive to
public concerns.
Following on this last point, it might be argued that basic freedoms of speech and
assembly suﬃce to satisfy Young’s criterion of legitimacy. If concerned citizens can
stage a peaceful protest, for example, it might seem that have opportunities to express
their opinions and raise questions and challenges. However, Young’s point is that
deliberative democracy requires eﬀective opportunities to participate in deliberation,
and that eﬀective opportunities require that others are appropriately responsive to
one’s concerns. An opportunity to protest — or even make a public statement before
a government body — is inadequate if it is simply ignored by other citizens and
government oﬃcials.
3. Explicit Exclusions: Public Reason and Expertise
Communicative democracy seems to require a framework of PUBLIC REASON:
factual, ethical, and epistemic assumptions shared by all members of the public and
that can provide the basis for democratic deliberation (Rawls 1993, lecture VI, and part
4; Gaus 2011). Without such a framework, PUBLIC REASON DEMOCRATS argue, citizens
will not be able to understand each others’ views, or the questions or challenges that
others raise against one’s own view. In other words, without a shared framework of
public reason, members of the public will simply talk past each other.
Public reason needn’t be COMPREHENSIVE, in the sense of giving answers to all
possible questions of ethics, justice, and public policy; indeed, in light of “the fact of
reasonable pluralism” it shouldn’t be comprehensive (Rawls 1993, 223ﬀ, et al. Gaus
2011, 2-3; Young 2000, 25). Instead, public reason only needs to be suﬃcient for
public deliberators to develop an overlapping consensus. For political purposes,
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arguments, concerns, and proposals don’t need to be true or objective; they merely
need to be INTERSUBJECTIVELY ACCEPTABLE, that is, acceptable (perhaps for diﬀerent
background reasons that are themselves not intersubjectively acceptable) from all of
the various perspectives that citizens hold.
Health and safety concerns might seem to provide an adequate framework for
public reason, at least on many kinds of issues. In its modern form, the health and
safety framework emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a way to ensure that public policy
decisions about new technology and environmental regulations were intersubjectively
acceptable (Shrader-Frechette 1991, 5-7; Irwin 1995, ch. 3). Note that the framework is
more than just a set of concepts: canons of toxicology, institutions for environmental
risk assessment, and guidelines for public policy decisionmaking were all developed
together, forming what sociologist Ulrich Beck calls the “risk society” (Beck [1986] 1992;
Irwin 1995, 43ﬀ) or what, focusing on governance, we might call the RISK POLITY. (The
contemporary institutionalization of the health and safety framing will be discussed
in further detail in §5.)
The health and safety framing of the GM controversy therefore seems to be
in line with deliberative democracy. Working within this framing, members of the
public don’t need to articulate their concerns in the idiosyncratic language of their
particular comprehensive conception. And, this framing suggests, we can side-step
arguments about “natural,” “playing god,” or anthrocentric vs. ecocentric values
(compare Comstock 2002). Anyone can raise health and safety concerns about
some new technology, and everyone can accept the technical standards for assessing
these concerns. In short, the health and safety framing seems to provide a basis for
intersubjectively acceptable policies, and thereby seems to help a political system
satisfy the legitimacy criterion.
But the health and safety framing can also be seen as technocratic (as argued by
Beck, Shrader-Frechette, Irwin, and many others). It assumes — and institutionalizes
— a sharp distinction between “the public” and “the experts.” The public can raise
concerns about a piece of technology or a policy, but only the experts — indeed,
only the experts with certain kinds of credentials and institutional aﬃliations — are
qualiﬁed to determine whether those concerns have any merit. But that is to say that
only these experts are qualiﬁed to actually deliberate about the technology or policy.
By restricting deliberation to credentialed experts in this way, the health and safety
framing explicitly excludes the public.
Speciﬁcally, under the health and safety framing, GM opponents are routinely
represented as ignorant, emotional, and irrational, in ways that purportedly contrast
with scientiﬁc expertise. For example, consider Blancke et al. (2015), an opinion piece
by a team of plant scientists and philosophers. They propose that
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Lay people [sic] are often unable or are simply not interested in investing
large amounts of time and energy to acquire a profound grasp of
complex technologies. Therefore, when lay people are confronted with
and have to evaluate information about GMOs and the risks involved,
they will predominantly rely on their intuitive mind. (Blancke et al.
2015, 2)
Because “negative representations produced by anti-GMO activists” appeal to aﬀective,
intuitive cognitive processes, they “will tend to outcompete the demonstrations of
scientists and other experts that require an enhanced cognitive eﬀort” (Blancke et al.
2015, 3).
Blancke et al. provide limited evidence that the cognitive and aﬀective processes
that they discuss — essentialism, teleological and intentional thinking (that is, concerns
about “naturalness”), and disgust — are actually at work when GM opponents form
anti-GM beliefs and attitudes. But note that, even if these cognitive processes are at
work, this does not imply that evidence and logic are not also at work. And Blancke et
al. do not provide arguments that these processes or the resulting beliefs and attitudes
are misleading or incorrect in the case of GM crops.
In a sidebar, Blancke et al. do brieﬂy consider the question of whether “there [are]
any reasonable scientiﬁc worries to account for the opposition against GMOs” (my
emphasis). But they dismiss this possibility immediately: “Some reports and studies
have claimed that GMOs per se badly aﬀect health, environment, and small farmers
in developing countries. These studies, however, turned out to be unsubstantiated.”
Then, insofar as GM opponents continue to cite these “unsubstantiated” studies, “the
opposition to GMOs resembles pseudosciences, such as ‘scientiﬁc’ creationism and
homeopathy, that mimic science in an attempt to gain respectability” (Blancke et al.
2015, 4). Blancke et al. do not cite any actual examples of GM opponents articulating
their concerns, much less analyze these concerns in any detail. They do not give
examples of the reports and studies that are cited to support GM opponents’ concerns,
nor any evidence that these reports and studies have been unsubstantiated. The only
citation given in this discussion is to a philosophical discussion of pseudoscience
that does not discuss GM crops at all. All together, Blancke et al. assume that GM
opponents are so obviously irrational that even evidence of their irrationality is
unnecessary.
Even if GM opponents do not deploy evidence and logic and have misleading or
incorrect beliefs and attitudes concerning GM crops, this does not justify excluding
them from democratic deliberation. First, it is plausible that inclusive, respectful
deliberation could be a more eﬀective way to correct mistaken beliefs and attitudes than
antagonistic, paternalistic shaming, for the simple reason that the former approach is
less likely to trigger a defensive or hostile response. Second, the inclusion of people
with heterodox beliefs and attitudes can help identify weaknesses in orthodox beliefs
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and attitudes, even if the heterodox beliefs and attitudes are ultimately mistaken
(compare Longino 1990, ch. 4), and the weaknesses in the orthodox position can
have important implications for policy design. For example, suppose it is true that
“the notion that growing GM crops with herbicide tolerance will promote so-called
superweeds falls back to the same misconception that a weed can be characterized by
a single gene” (Blancke et al. 2015, 2), that is, suppose that concerns about herbicide
tolerant weeds are based on mistaken genetic beliefs. Nonetheless, more attention
to these concerns in the design of policies regulating the use of herbicide tolerant
GM crops might have prevented or signiﬁcantly slowed the evolution of herbicide
tolerant weeds, which today is a serious problem (The Impact of Genetically Engineered
Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United States 2010, 4-5, 13-14, 71ﬀ; Bonny 2015).
Finally, Young’s criterion of legitimacy requires that members of the public have
eﬀective opportunities to raise questions and challenges, and receive responses to
them. This does not require that the questions and challenges be based on correct
beliefs and reliable cognitive processes. But it does require that the expert respondents
address the actual content of the questions and challenges, and that members of the
public have the opportunity to point out when the experts have not understood their
questions and challenges. This kind of back-and-forth between “the public” and “the
experts” is unlikely to happen when the public are explicitly excluded from technical
risk assessment discussions.
While Blancke et al. claim that their argument “is not intended to character-
ize public worries in general as irrational,” they also assert that the views of GM
opponents “arise from sources that cannot be trusted prima facie,” and propose “im-
munizing” people against “negative GMO representations” by “Instructi[ng] …young
people about biotechnology and its implications …[using] educational strategies that
speciﬁcally target and tweak intuitive modes of thinking” (Blancke et al. 2015, 4).
This science communication proposal falls squarely within the “deﬁcit model” of the
public understanding of science, which has been heavily criticized for decades (Wynne
1991; Gross 1994; Gouyon 2016). In short, Blancke et al. represent the public as
ignorant, emotional, and irrational, requiring correction and education from experts,
and therefore deserving exclusion from actual deliberation about the risks, beneﬁts,
and policy uses of GM crops.5
Strikingly, the explicit exclusion of GM opponents as members of the ignorant,
emotional, irrational, non-expert public can happen even in the context of disagree-
ment among credentialed experts about health and safety risks (Demortain 2013). In a
5. Some readers of earlier drafts have argued that the exclusion of non-experts is an implicit
exclusion, not an explicit one, and so the last few paragraphs should belong in the next section.
However, I have trouble understanding these arguments; and calling for a one-way communication
from experts to an ignorant, irrational public seems to me like a very explicit way of excluding members
of the public from deliberation. In any case, since my overall argument in this paper is that food
regime concerns are excluded, it is less important whether they are excluded explicitly, implicitly, or
both.
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Feature piece in Nature Biotechnology, science writer and biologist Laura DeFrancesco
discusses several technical critiques of conventional toxicological assessments for GM
crops. DeFrancesco identiﬁes several diﬀerent concerns from PhD-holding scientists
about standard animal model (lab rat) assessment methods, including short duration,
small samples, and interspecies extrapolation (DeFrancesco 2013, 800). Yet near the
end of the piece she attributes concerns about GM crops to “sensational food stories,”
misinformation, political manipulation, and public expectations of “deﬁnitive and
absolute answers to questions of food safety” (DeFrancesco 2013, 801). Because they
question the mainstream methods and standards for assessing the risks of GM crops,
credentialed experts are recast as ignorant, irrational members of the “lay” public.
In these ways, actual deliberation about GM crops is restricted to the subset of
credentialed experts who accept current toxicological regulatory standards. In this
light, the health and safety framing is explicitly exclusive and democratically illegitimate.
It might be argued that political deference to extra-public, nondemocratic forms
of expertise is necessary if decisions are to be made on the basis of intersubjectively
acceptable good reasons. That is, public reason might require a certain degree of
technocracy. For example, at the end of an opinion piece targeting “relativism” and
“postmodernism” in the European GM controversy, Marcel Kuntz, a biologist with
the French National Center for Scientiﬁc Research [CNRS], argues that
In the face of alleged uncertainties, many politicians and citizens ﬁnd it
reassuring to examine several ‘truths’ and shifting paradigms in risk as-
sessment. However, doing so with no reference to indisputable scientiﬁc
knowledge renders risk assessment unscientiﬁc, increases uncertainty
and paves the way for arbitrary decisions. (Kuntz 2012)
However, as Mark Brown argues in Science in Democracy, the status of uncertainties
as merely “alleged” and scientiﬁc knowledge as “indisputable” become political matters
when these claims take on political or policy signiﬁcance (Brown 2009, chs. 5, 8).
Bracket the arguments of Second Wave sociologists and historians of science —
Kuntz’ scapegoat — who were generally concerned with political disputes within
the scientiﬁc community. Even when scientiﬁc knowledge claims are beyond dispute
among scientists, and so might claim clear epistemic authority, it is a further question
how much and what kind of political authority they have for the purposes of setting
public policy. An enormous body of research that GM crops are safe to eat may
warrant very little weight if people’s primary concerns are about the social, political,
and economic impacts of these crops, or if there are concerns that this research has
been inﬂuenced too much by the economic interests of the agricultural biotechnology
industry (Krimsky 2015, 24-6).
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In other words, toxicology enjoys greater political authority over GM crops than
economics, political science, sociology, or STS. This is not because toxicology is
epistemologically superior to these other ﬁelds, but because of logically prior, often
implicit, contingent decisions about which kinds of concerns and which methods of
empirical research are relevant to the governance of GM crops. These are political
decisions: decisions about which kinds of arguments and evidence can be used
by whom to make decisions that carry political authority. In this way political
authority comes from other political processes, not the mere fact of epistemic authority.
Speciﬁcally, in a deliberative democratic polity, the political authority of scientists and
scientiﬁc knowledge should come from legitimate democratic political deliberation —
that is, deliberation in which both experts and “lay” people, both proponents and
opponents of GM crops, have eﬀective opportunities to present their views, challenge
the views of others, and receive responses to their challenges.
This does not mean that the political authority of scientists is “purely political”
and has nothing to do with their epistemic reliability. But it does mean that democratic
processes should be used to determine the political standing that scientists should
enjoy by virtue of their epistemic reliability. The political signiﬁcance of scientiﬁc
expertise is a question for democratic public deliberation (see also Sarewitz 2004;
Pearce and Raman 2014).
All together, my critique of the health and safety framing is this section is not
with its reliance on expertise as such. Rather, it’s with the way this framing renders
expertise politically unaccountable; that scientiﬁc expertise is taken to exclude, and
even be opposed to, public deliberation.
4. Implicit Exclusions of Food Regime Concerns
As noted above, Young emphasizes the way norms of “style and idiom” — the
form of speech acts — create implicit exclusions (Young 2000, 55-6ﬀ). I am more
interested here in implicit exclusions based on the content of claims.6 Speciﬁcally, in
the GM controversy, typically only health and safety concerns are recognized and
acceptable (and only when they are accompanied by deference to certain credentialed
experts, as discussed in the last section). Food regime concerns, by contrast, are
typically not recognized or not accepted as legitimate concerns. In this section, I
discuss three ways in which food regime concerns — and thus people who hold them
— are implicitly excluded by GM proponents: by being conﬂated with health concerns,
dismissed as irrelevant, or responded to with logical non sequiturs.7
6. Issues of media are also relevant: journal publications — even ones sponsored by industry and
not peer reviewed — are likely to be received diﬀerently from blog posts, self-published books by
independent researchers, or whitepapers from advocacy organizations.
7. There are moments in which food regime concerns are recognized and accepted as legitimate.
For example, a major recent National Academies report on GM crops (National Academies of Sciences,
Daniel J. Hicks Genetically Modified Crops, Inclusion, and Democracy 14
Consider ﬁrst conﬂation. In an opinion piece targeting GM opponents, Norman
Borlaug — agronomist and Nobel Peace Prize winner — represents opponents as
“Extremists in the environmental movement largely from rich nations and/or the
privileged strata of society in poor nations” who are trying “to stop scientiﬁc progress
in its tracks” (Borlaug 2000, 488). He quotes concerns about GM crops from two
African writers: “The US does not need to grow nor donate genetically modiﬁed crops.
To donate untested food and seed to Africa is not an act of kindness but an attempt to
lure Africa into further dependence on foreign aid”; “Countries in the grip of a crisis are
unlikely to have leverage to say, ‘This crop is contaminated; we’re not taking it”’ (quoted
in Borlaug 2000, 489, my emphasis). Borlaug immediately dismisses these concerns
in terms of health risks and credentialed expertise: “Neither of these individuals oﬀers
any credible scientiﬁc evidence to back their false assertions concerning the safety of
genetically modiﬁed foods” (Borlaug 2000, 489).
To be sure, the quotations given by Borlaug gesture at health and safety concerns,
with their language of “untested” and “contaminated” food and crops. But the
quotations also include food regime concerns — indicated by my emphasis — about
the power of postcolonial Africa relative to the US. I might even argue that the food
regime concerns are more signiﬁcant here than the health and safety concerns. And
Borlaug does not respond to the food regime concerns at all. It seems that either he
does not recognize these concerns or he conﬂates them with the health and safety
concerns. In either case, the food regime concerns are excluded.
It might be objected that Borlaug, an agronomist, should not be expected to
recognize food regime concerns. After all, concerns about neocolonialism are well
outside of his areas of expertise; he was almost certainly more familiar with safety
concerns, and quite reasonably focused on those elements of the quotations.8 I agree
that Borlaug is not culpable, that is, that he cannot be held morally responsible for
failing to do something that he lacked the ability to do. However, even if Borlaug
is not culpable, his response still has the eﬀect of excluding food regime concerns,
and it is this exclusion that matters for democratic legitimacy. Further, the fact that
Borlaug, as an agronomist, did not need to have the ability to recognize food regime
Engineering, and Medicine 2016) includes a full chapter on economic beneﬁts and food regime
concerns; over twenty distinct food regime concerns (characterized variously as “economic,” “public
and social goods,” or “scientiﬁc progress” concerns) in the list of summarized public comments; and
discussions of food regime concerns (characterized as “socioeconomic issues”) in the regulation of
agricultural biotechnology (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, 315-6,
333-4). In the chapter, the report committee generally ﬁnds that the evidence available to address food
regime concerns is limited and generally recommends more and more rigorous empirical research;
in the regulatory discussion, the committee recommends that “socioeconomic issues that go beyond
product safety are technology-governance issues that should be addressed by policy-makers, the
private sector, and the public” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2016, 334).
Thanks to Eric Kennedy for encouraging me to note that there are some moments of more productive
engagement.
8. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this objection.
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concerns as such — that is, the absence of an expectation that he should be able to
recognize food regime concerns, and respond to them appropriately — itself reﬂects
the marginalization of food regime concerns.
Next is dismissal as irrelevant. My example here comes from the end of a multi-
article exchange in AgBioForum, which describes itself as “the journal of agrobiotech-
nology management and economics.” The exchange involves Martina McGloughlin —
a molecular biologist and biotechnologist by training and, at the time of the exchange,
the Director of the Biotechnology Program at the University of California-Davis — and
Miguel Altieri and Peter Rosset (McGloughlin 1999; Altieri and Rosset, 1999a, 1999b).
Altieri and Rosset raise a number of concerns about GM crops, including lower yields
and unforeseeable environmental consequences, but especially food regime concerns.
McGloughlin generally ignores the food regime concerns, focusing on yields and
health and safety issues until her “Concluding Comments.” There she asserts that
“Altieri and Rosset’s arguments are neither scientiﬁcally supported [n]or really about
biotechnology.” Instead, they’re “primarily directed against Western-type capitalism
and associated institutions (e.g., intellectual property rights, the WTO).” This “political
battle,” she asserts, should be taken to “other, more appropriate fora” (McGloughlin
1999, 10, her parentheses). Again, this in the pages of a journal for “agrobiotechnology
management and economics.” On McGloughlin’s view, food regime concerns are
simply irrelevant to the GM crop controversy, and can be dismissed as such.
Finally, there is the use of non sequiturs to respond to food regime concerns.
Unlike conﬂation, this kind of implicit exclusion seems to recognize that food regime
concerns are distinct from health and safety concerns; and unlike dismissal, it seems
to recognize them as legitimate. However, a logically irrelevant response still fails to
give appropriate respect to food regime concerns and the people who hold them. In
this way, non sequiturs are also an implicit exclusion of food regime concerns.
For example, in a Comment piece in Nature on the use of GM crops in Africa,
Whitty et al. recognize two sets of food regime concerns:
(1) “Growing non-GM crops may make better economic sense if using a GM variety
would tie farmers to proprietary seeds or agrochemicals, lock them out of
certain European markets, or restrict them to providing only animal feeds.”
(2) “Much of the European opposition to GM crops, although couched solely as
worries about safety, also stems from concerns about the eﬀect of large-scale
farming on small-scale farmers, and the potential for biotech companies to
create monopolies.” (Whitty et al. 2013, 32)
The following paragraph seems to be Whitty et al.’s only response to the ﬁrst set
of concerns:
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Yet decision-makers in developing economies should be wary of a polar-
ized debate that is playing out in countries where the potential beneﬁts
to society of improved crop varieties are marginal, and where people’s
stances towards GM foods do not necessarily reﬂect a considered view
about the scientiﬁc technique and its alternatives. (Whitty et al. 2013,
32)
That is, in response to concerns about economic impacts of GM crops on smallholder
farmers in Africa, Whitty et al. argue that GM crops have less potential beneﬁts in
Europe than in Africa and that Europeans with concerns about GM crops may be
misinformed.
The following seems to be Whitty et al.’s response to the second point:
people often equate all biotechnology with genetic engineering —
putting the wide range of advanced non-GM techniques used to improve
crops, such as tissue culture and marker-assisted breeding, into the ‘un-
acceptable’ category. These techniques can greatly assist conventional
breeding eﬀorts. (Whitty et al. 2013, 32)
That is, in response to concerns about smallholder farmers and agricultural biotech
monopolies, Whitty et al. point out that molecular biology can be used to improve
crops in ways that are not strictly genetic modiﬁcation.
It might be argued that Whitty et al. do not intend for these passages to respond
to the food regime concerns they identify in (1) and (2). But there are no other passages
in the piece that are any more relevant to these kinds of concerns. So this defense
amounts to saying that, rather than committing a gross non sequitur, they have simply
failed to respond to these concerns in any way at all. Furthermore, the structural
relationship between these quotations suggests that these were indeed intended to be
responses to food regime concerns: quotation (1) comes from the ﬁrst paragraph of
the section; what I have quoted as its response is the second paragraph; and quotation
(2) and what I have identiﬁed as its response form the third paragraph.
All together, there are at least three mechanisms by which food regime concerns
are implicitly excluded from the GM controversy: conﬂation with health and safety
concerns, dismissal as irrelevant, and the use of non sequiturs. Members of the public
with food regime concerns are not necessarily excluded formally or de jure; formally,
it might seem that everyone is free to participate in the discussion. But only so long
as they raise only health and safety concerns, and defer to expert decisions about
the signiﬁcance of these concerns. Other concerns, or failure to defer to experts,
are treated as grounds to have one’s views marginalized, ignored, or ridiculed. This
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is often a de facto, implicit exclusion. And by Young’s criterion it is democratically
illegitimate.
5. Institutions for Health and Safety
The last two sections of this paper have focused on the exclusion of food regime
concerns from public deliberation on GM crops. This section considers governmental
or regulatory deliberation, or the institutions that have political authority to regulate
GM crops. I ﬁrst consider the problem of explaining the predominance of the health
and safety framing in public deliberation. If this framing leads to explicit and implicit
exclusions of GM opponents, then why is it so prevalent? I consider two potential
explanations, and show that each has substantial limitations. However, the limitations
of these other explanations suggest an important role for national-level political
institutions. I then focus on the federal agencies that regulate GM crops in the US.
I show how these institutions work within the health and safety framing, and show
how this is due to both a key White House memo and the statutory basis (that is, the
legal foundation) for their regulatory authority over these crops.9 I propose that this
institutionalization of the health and safety framing — at the governmental level —
helps explain the predominance of the health and safety framing at the public level.
First, how can we explain the predominance of the health and safety framing in
the public discourse on GM crops? One obvious potential explanation is strategic.
Insofar as the health and safety framing excludes GM opponents, it is useful for GM
proponents to work within that framing. To put it crudely, it is much easier to win a
public debate against misinformed, irrational, anti-science zealots than against people
with reasonable concerns about political and economic power.
However, this does not explain why GM opponents frequently work within the
health and safety framing, even entangling food regime concerns together with health
and safety concerns. For example, Natural News is a major alternative medicine
and anti-GM website. A recent piece (which I found by simply searching the site for
“GMO”) focuses primarily on health concerns. But food regime concerns also appear
throughout the piece, including concerns that GM crops have “Poor ﬁnancial returns
for farmers” and “violate farmers [sic] rights (Monsanto takes farmers’ farms away by
lawsuits monthly),” that “Non GMO corn seed became much more expensive in North
America after Monsanto produced GM corn seed,” and that “When put into practice,
the beneﬁts [of GM crops] accrue to Big Agriculture while the costs are paid for by
the consumer and society in the form of higher prices, toxic food, and environmental
9. These two points have been discussed extensively in the STS and philosophy of technology
literature on GM crops. I do not claim any novel contributions with either of these points, but instead
review them for readers who are less familiar with US agricultural biotechnology governance.
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degradation” (Edwards 2015, parentheses in original; my brackets).10 These food
regime concerns are not placed in a separate section or otherwise presented in a way
that would help readers distinguish them from health and safety concerns. Indeed, by
interspersing food regime concerns throughout a piece that is primarily about health
and safety, the story gives the impression that food regime concerns are somehow a
subset of health and safety concerns. This would seem to make it easier, not harder,
for GM proponents to conﬂate and dismiss food regime concerns, which presents a
problem for any strategic explanation: GM opponents seem to have good reasons to
resist the predominance of the health and safety framing, and yet they play into it.
Both Kinchy, Kleinman, and Autry (2008) and Thompson (2014) give INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS for the predominance of the health and safety
framing. That is, both papers point to the role of international political institu-
tions in shaping the terms of public deliberation, and speciﬁcally international trade
agreements such as the Sanitary and Phytosanitary [SPS] Agreement of the World
Trade Organization. Using the controversy over recombinant bovine growth hormone
[rBGH] in the 1990s as a case study, both argue that the SPS Agreement requires that
agricultural trade bans be based on “an assessment, as appropriate to the circum-
stances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health” (“Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures” 2016, §5.1), thereby excluding
food regime concerns. Indeed, both papers argue that the SPS Agreement, and
international trade institutions more broadly, presuppose the corporate food regime,
that is, the food regime that many GM opponents reject.
This kind of institutional explanation can help us resolve the puzzle for strategic
explanations: while GM opponents have good reasons to resist the predominance
of the health and safety framing, working within it may be the only way to get any
recognition that they have any concerns at all. As Thompson puts it, “regulatory tools
that focus on food safety and environmental risk are the only means left to even slow
the potentially devastating social and economic consequences of farmer bankruptcy
and dispossession” (Thompson 2014, 14).
10. To be clear, this particular story contains numerous factual claims that are controversial, highly
questionable, and in my opinion potentially misleading. It does not include any citations or links
to references. In particular, based on my understanding of the state of the empirical literature: GM
crops are generally associated with increases in farmers’ proﬁts, though the size of the eﬀect is highly
uncertain and context-dependent; Monsanto does sue farmers for knowingly violating their patents,
but not for cases of accidental contamination; the price of seed corn has roughly tripled since 1996,
but it is not clear to me to what extent this is due to an increase in the real price of non-GM seed
corn; and even if GM foods are causing public health problems, the lack of postmarket consumption
data for GM foods makes it impossible to empirically attribute any such problems to consuming these
foods. Natural News is frequently targeted by “anti-anti-GM” writers as a source of misinformation
about GM crops. I am quoting Natural News here not because I agree with any of their claims —
in this particular story or anywhere else — but to illustrate how health and safety and food regime
concerns are entangled in a major anti-GM venue.
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However, international institutional explanations have a puzzle of their own. In
other work, Kleinman, Kinchy, and Autry (2009) argue that diﬀerent sets of concerns
carry more or less weight in diﬀerent countries. In Europe, at the EU level, health
and safety concerns are primary but food regime concerns play a secondary and
less explicit role in some cases (Kleinman, Kinchy, and Autry 2009, 366-7). Further,
“Austria’s Genetic Engineering Act of 1994 represents an eﬀort to implement the
social regulation of biotechnology,” that is, regulation that is responsive to food
regime concerns (Kleinman, Kinchy, and Autry 2009, 368-9), while US biotechnology
policy is based almost entirely on health and safety concerns (Kleinman, Kinchy,
and Autry 2009, 364-5; see also the remainder of this section). This national-level
variation limits the explanatory power of international institutional explanations:
WTO agreements cannot explain why food regime concerns carry a great deal of
weight in Austria but basically none in the US. This variation among nations suggests
a need for NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS, namely, explanations that appeal
to the role of the health and safety framing in national-level regulation of GM crops.
US biotechnology policy is primarily based on the “Coordinated Framework,”
a memo prepared by the White House Oﬃce of Science and Technology Policy
[OSTP] (Kingsbury and Jennings 1986).11 The memo was directly concerned with the
question of “whether the regulatory framework that pertained to products developed by
traditional genetic manipulation techniques [sic; for example, conventional breeding]
was adequate for products obtained with the new techniques [that is, biotechnology]”
(Kingsbury and Jennings 1986, 3*), and concluded that — except for some “microbial
products” — adequate statutory authority already existed at the Department of
Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Services [APHIS], the Environmental
Protection Agency’s Plant Incorporated Protectants program [PIP], and the Department
of Health and Human Services through the Food and Drug Administration [FDA].
(In what follows, I refer to these agencies collectively as “the agencies.”) That is, the
Coordinated Framework asserts that the agencies generally have adequate authority
to regulate biotechnology under existing legislation.12
The Coordinated Framework adopts the health and safety framing: the existing
legislation is referred to as “health and safety laws” (Kingsbury and Jennings 1986, 3*),
and the memo instructs the agencies “to assure the safety of microbial products and
yet minimize impediments to intellectual and economic advances in biotechnology”
(Kingsbury and Jennings 1986, 40*). Economics expertise is mentioned, but only to
11. The only electronic copy of this document available is a PDF reconstruction of the original text
that does not include the original pagination. Starred page numbers used in citations here indicate
pages in this PDF ﬁle.
12. In July 2015, the OSTP announced a “modernization” eﬀort for the Coordinated Framework
(Holdren et al. 2015). As of April 2016, the three agencies have hosted a series of public meetings
on biotechnology policy. Since work on this paper began some time before the public meetings, a
systematic analysis of public comments is not included here. However, I do hope to conduct such an
analysis in the future. Informally, a substantial minority of comments raise food regime concerns, and
the agencies have generally ignored these concerns.
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“estimate the beneﬁts of the product[s]” (Kingsbury and Jennings 1986, 64). In the
next several paragraphs, I show how the health and safety framing is institutionalized
at each of the three agencies and at the Patent and Trademark Oﬃce.
As an agency, USDA’s mandate is to promote US agriculture. Speciﬁcally, APHIS is
responsible for protecting the health of agricultural plants and animals. Regarding GM
crops, APHIS regulations apply while GM crops are under development: developers
must apply for permits from APHIS in order to cultivate experimental test plots. In
this permitting process, APHIS is concerned with weeds and plant pathogens. The
APHIS 2015-2019 Strategic Plan, goal 4, describes the program’s basic approach to
the regulation of GM crops: “Ensure the safety, purity, and eﬀectiveness of veterinary
biologics and protect plant health by optimizing our oversight of GE organisms”
(Strategic Plan 2015-2019 2015, 14). At the end of development, developers apply to
APHIS for “nonregulated status.” This allows the crop to be grown without a permit;
that is, it can be sold to farmers for general commercial cultivation.
The EPA’s PIP program acquires its regulatory authority from the Federal Insecti-
cide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act [FIFRA]. FIFRA requires pre-market registration
of all pesticides; speciﬁcally, “the applicant must show that the pesticide ‘when used in
accordance with widespread and commonly recognized practice, …will not generally
cause unreasonable adverse eﬀects on the environment”’ (Environmental Protection
Agency 2001, 37773, quoting 7 USC 136a(c)(5)). “Unreasonable adverse eﬀects” are
deﬁned to include “any unreasonable risk to man [sic] or the environment, taking into
account the economic, social, and environmental costs and beneﬁts of the use of any
pesticide”; that is, adverse eﬀects would seem to include not only health and safety
concerns but also food regime concerns. However, as far as I have been able to tell,
the only social and economic concerns that are considered in the published regulatory
guidelines are the beneﬁts associated with approving the registration or exemption
of a GM crop. For example, in a discussion of a major exemption to the pesticide
guidelines, the EPA points to the “general beneﬁts to society from the practices of
horticulture and of agriculture in producing the food supply and other plant based
products (e.g., ﬁber, lumber), and economic beneﬁts to growers, and the environment”
as among the reasons for granting the exemption (Environmental Protection Agency
2001, 37802). Thus, it seems that “unreasonable adverse eﬀects” refer to the health
and safety risks of a GM crop as weighted against its potential social and economic
beneﬁts. Food regime concerns — social and economic hazards — do not appear to
be taken into account.
At the agency level, FDA’s mandate is to protect human health. Primary regulatory
responsibility for GM food plants rests with the agency’s Center for Food Safety and
Applied Nutrition, and speciﬁcally the Plant Biotechnology Consultation Program;
there is a separate program for GM food animals in the agency’s Center for Veterinary
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Medicine.13 GM foods are evaluated as potential ADULTERANTS, “an added poisonous
or deleterious substance that may render the food injurious to health or a naturally
occurring substance that is ordinarily injurious” (Food and Drug Administration 1992,
14*).14 One of the key concepts used by FDA in evaluating GM foods is SUBSTANTIAL
EQUIVALENCE, which is deﬁned in terms of the presence of known toxicants in the
host and donor species; the potential for the transfer of allergens; and the nutritional
content of the GM food (in terms of both proteins and other macronutrients, as well
as both the normal consumption of the food and as a result of genetic recombination)
(Food and Drug Administration 1992, 21*; for further discussion of the process of
regulating GM foods at FDA, see Jasanoﬀ 2005, 132ﬀ; Meghani 2014).
A response to public comments on food animal cloning shows how the health
and safety framing is institutionalized at FDA. To its credit, the agency recognizes
that “moral, religious, or ethical issues” and economic concerns — for example,
consolidation in the dairy industry — are not health and safety concerns; it does not
conﬂate the various categories of concerns. It also does not respond with non sequiturs.
Instead, the agency declines to respond to these concerns on the grounds that it “has
not been charged with addressing moral, religious, or ethical issues associated with
animal cloning for agricultural purposes.” Similarly, “It is not …FDA’s responsibility
to assess potential economic impacts of its regulated products …. The decision to use
cloning technology in food producing animals will be up to the individual producer.”
(“FDA’s Response to Public Comment on the Animal Cloning Risk Assessment, Risk
Management Plan, and Guidance for Industry” 2008; see also Meghani and de Melo-
Martín 2009). The FDA’s only constructive response to these food regime concerns
is to suggest that “discussions on these ethical concerns about animal cloning for
agricultural purposes should be held in the larger context of …assisted reproductive
technologies.” But the agency does not indicate which social institutions might be
appropriate for carrying out these discussions, nor which governmental institutions
might have the statutory authority to use them as the basis for regulation. While the
tone of FDA’s response is much less contemptuous than McGloughlin’s dismissal of
Altieri and Rosset, the substance of the response is, like McGloughlin’s, a dismissal
of food regime concerns as irrelevant to the agency’s evaluation. Whether because
13. Although tangential to my argument in this paper, it’s worth noting that the Consultation Program
is a voluntary process that does not conclude with a determination that a GM food is safe to eat. That
is, ﬁrst, developers of a new GM food are not required, either by law or by regulation, to consult with
the FDA. While the program is voluntary, as I understand it every GM food available in US markets
has gone through the program. Next, at the end of the consultation process, FDA does not formally
conclude that the food under consideration is safe to eat. Instead, the agency reports that the developer
has concluded that the food is substantially equivalent to a non-GM food and so does not require
premarket review or approval by the agency. Based on a review of composition data provided by the
developer, the agency’s own conclusion is that “we have no further questions” about the safety of the
GM food. See, for example, “Biotechnology Consultation Agency Response Letter BNF 000144” 2015.
14. The only electronic copy of this document available is an unpaginated web site. Starred page
numbers used in citations here indicate pages in a PDF generated using the web browser’s print
function.
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of the agency’s internal culture, lack of requisite social science and ethical expertise,
or the limited scope of its statutory authority, food regime concerns are somebody
else’s problem. But insofar as this somebody else does not exist, they become nobody’s
problem.
In addition to these three regulatory agencies, the US Patent and Trademark
Oﬃce [PTO] has signiﬁcant inﬂuence over the development and commercialization of
GM crops, insofar as PTO is responsible for awarding IP rights over newly-developed
crops and the technologies used to make them. Shobita Parthasarathy notes that, in
the US, patent award decisions are regarded as narrowly technical questions. Patent
examiners base their decisions on the novelty, inventiveness, and utility of the proposal
— roughly, whether the proposed invention is actually new and whether it actually
works as described — along with legislative and judicial constraints on what kinds
of things can be patented. Parthasarathy goes on to argue that there are substantial
literacy, bureaucratic, and institutional barriers between PTO and publics. These
barriers are maintained using some of the mechanisms that we have seen at work in
the GM controversy. For example, in her discussion of some major early biotechnology
patent cases, Parthasarathy argues that PTO oﬃcials “classif[ied] the contributions
of outsiders as subjective ‘opinions’ or ‘ethics,’ which had no place in this technical
domain” (Parthasarathy 2011, 273). All together, decisions in PTO exclude both health
and safety and food regime concerns. Both the economic and health eﬀects of a GM
food are irrelevant to the PTO; all that matters is whether the method of producing it
is suﬃciently novel and reliable.
All together, the three agencies with primary responsibility for regulating GM
crops in the US — USDA, EPA, and FDA — operate within under Coordinated
Framework and statutory authorities that assume the health and safety framing.
While the speciﬁc policies and procedures used by these agencies for GM crops are
no more than about 30 years old, they are all explicitly and by design extensions
of previous policies and procedures and the agencies’ institutional cultures and
regulatory authority, all of which assume the health and safety framing. According
to the political philosophy apparently motivating this regulatory system, regulations
can and should be used to protect consumers from illness and injury, and otherwise
market processes should determine where and how technologies will be used. Pat
Roberts, Republican Senator from Kansas and Chair of the Senate Committee on
Agriculture in the 2015-2016 US Congress, stated this explicitly in his comments at
the close of a recent hearing on agricultural biotechnology: “Mandates at any level
[of government] should be based on science and address the concerns of health and
safety. Mandating regulations with any metric or yardstick other than science, health,
and safety exceeds the role of government” (“Agriculture Biotechnology” 2015, from
approximate time index 3:12). Economic harms to individual farmers are just the cost
of eﬃciency; and supraindividual harms to communities or cultures are not even on
the radar. Thompson traces this view back to John Stuart Mill:
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society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed
competitors to immunity from this kind of suﬀering, and feels called on
to interfere only when means of success have been employed which it is
contrary to the general interest to permit—namely, fraud or treachery
and force. (Mill (1859) 2008, 115, quoted in Thompson 2014, 7)
Given this institutional setting, the predominance of the health and safety framing
in public discourse about GM crops is not surprising. As the food animal cloning
case illustrates, even when food regime are recognized as distinct and intelligible,
government regulators will not or cannot take them into account when making
regulatory decisions. Thus, both proponents and opponents of GM crops have
compelling strategic reasons to articulate their points of view in terms of health
and safety, in both public and regulatory contexts. Proponents can claim that the
preponderance of evidence indicates that GM crops are safe, and therefore these
crops should be registered or de-regulated for commercial use; opponents have little
choice but to present their concerns in terms of health and safety — even when this is
a misrepresentation — if they hope to achieve any regulatory traction. Insofar as GM
opponents continue to articulate food regime concerns as such, they are eﬀectively
excluded from regulatory deliberation.
This national institutional explanation complements the strategic and interna-
tional institutional explanations for the public predominance of GM crops. National
and international institutions determine the payoﬀ matrix, as it were, within which
GM opponents must decide how to articulate their concerns. International institutions
explain the global predominance of the health and safety framing; diﬀerences in
national institutions explain why this framing is more or less predominant in diﬀerent
countries.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined the predominance of the health and safety framing
of the controversy over GM crops. I have argued that the framing leads to both
explicit and implicit exclusions of food regime concerns, and by extension publics
who have such concerns. In addition, I have suggested that the predominance of
the health and safety framing in the broader public controversy can be explained in
part as a strategic response to the fact that this framing is institutionalized in the US
regulatory scheme for GM crops.
Young’s model of communicative democracy implies that the health and safety
framing undermines the legitimacy of public discourse and regulatory decisionmak-
ing on GM crops. GM opponents with food regime concerns lack equal eﬀective
opportunities to participate in discussion, deliberation, and decision-making. They
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lack eﬀective opportunities to present their views, question and challenge the views
of GM proponents, and have their questions and challenges answered.
The connection that I have suggested between public discourse and government
institutions for regulating agricultural biotechnology means that this framing is
doubly illegitimate at the governmental level. First, insofar as the governmental-
level predominance of the health and safety framing contributes to the public-level
exclusion, the governmental-level framing contributes to an illegitimate exclusion.
And second, because this framing excludes food regime concerns at the governmental
level, governmental deliberations are illegitimate on their own, independently of any
inﬂuence on public discourse.
The predominance of the health and safety framing might also explain why the
controversy over GM crops is so intractable. Proponents of GM crops frequently
complain that opponents have not been satisﬁed by the body of evidence (or “scientiﬁc
consensus”) that indicates that GM crops do not pose any health or safety risks (see,
for example Lynas 2015; for critical discussion, see Krimsky 2015). Surprisingly,
the controversy remains unsettled, despite this body of evidence; frustratingly, GM
opponents do not “listen to reason”; the controversy is intractable. However, this
surprise and frustration only makes sense given the health and safety framing. Insofar
as GM opponents have food regime concerns that are logically distinct from health
and safety concerns, then we should not expect health and safety evidence to assuage
their concerns. Feeding GM corn to lab rats does not tell us, one way or the other,
whether certain large agricultural biotechnology companies have too much power
over small farmers. It is thus unsurprising that the controversy is so intractable.
Finally, my analysis suggests that governmental institutions have a key role to play
in moving the GM crops controversy forward. Given statutory limitations on their
authority and a lack of relevant expertise, it’s implausible that any of the three agencies
could simply incorporate food regime concerns into their regulatory decisionmaking.
However, while they may not be able to respond to food regime concerns, this does not
mean that they cannot recognize and respect them. For instance, the FDA’s response to
food regime concerns surrounding animal cloning shows that the agency is capable
of recognizing these concerns as such, even when they lack the authority to regulate
based on them. The problem, in this case, was the agency’s lack of respect for these
concerns, which were simply dismissed as someone else’s problem. A more respectful
approach might have tried to coordinate decisionmaking with an agency that does have
the appropriate authority, such as PTO or the Federal Trade Commission (responsible
for regulating potential monopolies). Alternatively, FDA might have directed an appeal
to legislators, explaining that citizens have these concerns and that the controversy
would likely persist until some government agency was given the authority to respond
to them. In the context of the GM controversy, either strategy — coordinating with
agencies with the appropriate authority, or calling on Congress to grant them the
appropriate authority — would at least partly remove the strong incentive for GM
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opponents to entangle health and safety concerns with food regime concerns, and
thus potentially help clarify the nature of the disagreement.
References
Altieri, Miguel, and Peter Rosset. 1999a. “Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology will Not Ensure Food Security, Protect The Envi-
ronment and Reduce Poverty in the Developing World.” AgBioForum 2 (3 & 4): 155–62.
. 1999b. “Strengthening the Case for Why Biotechnology will Not Help the Developing World: A Response to McGlough-
lin.” AgBioForum 2 (3 & 4): 226–36. Accessed May 1, 2014. http://agbioforum.org/v2n34/v2n34a14-altieri.htm.
Ankley, Gerald T., Richard S. Bennett, Russell J. Erickson, Dale J. Hoﬀ, Michael W. Hornung, Rodney D. Johnson, David R.
Mount, et al. 2010. “Adverse outcome pathways: A conceptual framework to support ecotoxicology research and risk
assessment.” Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 29, no. 3 (March): 730–41. doi:10.1002/etc.34.
Beck, Ulrich. (1986) 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Translated by Mark Ritter. London, Newbury Park, and New
Delhi: Sage Publictions.
Biddle, Justin. 2014. “Can patents prohibit research?: On the social epistemology of patenting and licensing in science.” Studies
in History and Philosophy of Science 45:14–23. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2013.12.001.
Blancke, Stefaan, Frank Van Breusegem, Geert De Jaeger, Johan Braeckman, and Marc Van Montagu. 2015. “Fatal Attraction:
The Intuitive Appeal of GMO Opposition.” Trends in Plant Science (April 10). doi:10.1016/j.tplants.2015.03.011.
Bonny, Sylive. 2015. “Genetically Modiﬁed Herbicide-Tolerant Crops, Weeds, and Herbicides: Overview and Impact.” Environ-
mental Management. doi:10.1007/s00267-015-0589-7.
Borlaug, Norman. 2000. “Ending World Hunger: The Promise of Biotechnology and the Threat of Antiscience Zealotry.” Plant
Physiology 124 (October): 487–90.
Brandt, Marisa. 2014. “Zapatista corn: A case study in biocultural innovation.” Social Studies of Science 44, no. 6 (December):
874–900. doi:10.1177/0306312714540060.
Bronson, Kelly. 2014. “Reﬂecting on the Science in Science Communication.” Canadian Journal of Communication 39:523–37.
Brown, Mark. 2009. Science in Democracy: Expertise, Institutions, and Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Burkhardt, Jeﬀrey. 1992. “On the ethics of technical change: The case of bST.” Technology in Society 14 (2): 221–43. doi:10.1016/
0160-791X(92)90005-U.
Busch, Lawrence, William Lacy, Jeﬀrey Burkhardt, and Laura Lacy. 1991. Plants, Power, and Proﬁt: Social, Economic, and Ethical
Consequences of the New Biotechnologies. Blackwell Publishing.
Comstock, Gary. 2002. “Ethics and Genetically Modiﬁed Foods: Debating Biotechnology.” Chap. 11 in Genetically Modiﬁed
Foods, edited by Michael Ruse and David Castle, 88–107. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
Cook, Guy, Elisa Pieri, and Peter Robbins. 2004. “‘The Scientists Think and the Public Feels’: Expert Perceptions of the
Discourse of GM Food.” Discourse Society 15 (4): 433–49. doi:10.1177/0957926504043708.
DeFrancesco, Laura. 2013. “How safe does transgenic food need to be?” Nature Biotechnology 31, no. 9 (September): 794–802.
doi:10.1038/nbt.2686.
Demortain, David. 2013. “Regulatory Toxicology in Controversy.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 38, no. 6 (May 27): 727–
48. doi:10.1177/0162243913490201.
Edwards, Joel. 2015. “GMOs are dangerous to our health, according to latest independent research.” Natural News ( July 19).
Accessed September 29, 2015. http://www.naturalnews.com/050454_GMO_research_biotech_dangers_health_issues.
html.
Environmental Protection Agency. 2001. “Regulations Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act for Plant-
Incorporated Protectants (Formerly Plant-Pesticides).” Federal Register ( July 19): 37772–37817.
Ervin, David, Leland Glenna, and Raymond Jussaume Jr. 2010. “Are Biotechnology and Sustainable Agriculture Compatible?”
Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems 25, no. 2 ( June): 143–57. doi:10.1017/S1742170510000189.
Food and Drug Administration. 1992. “Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties.” Federal Register 57, no. 22984 (March 29).
Accessed September 5, 2015. http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/
Biotechnology/ucm096095.htm.
Food Biotechnology: A Communicator’s Guide to Improving Understanding. 2013. International Food Information Council Founda-
tion.
Friedmann, Harriet. 1993. “The Political Economy of Food: A Global Crisis.” New Left Review I/197 ( January-February): 29–57.
. 2005. “From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes.” Research in Rural
Sociology and Development 11:227–64. doi:10.1016/S1057-1922(05)11009-9.
Gaus, Gerald. 2011. The Order of Public Reason. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Glenna, Leland, John Tooker, Rick Welsh, and David Ervin. 2015. “Intellectual Property, Scientiﬁc Independence, and the
Eﬃcacy and Environmental Impacts of Genetically Engineered Crops.” Rural Sociology 80, no. 2 ( June): 147–72. doi:10.
1111/ruso.12062.
Goldburg, Rebecca, Jane Rissler, Hope Shand, and Chuck Hassebrook. 1990. Biotechnology’s Bitter Harvest. Technical report.
Biotechnology Working Group, March.
Daniel J. Hicks Genetically Modified Crops, Inclusion, and Democracy 26
Gouyon, Jean-Baptiste. 2016. “1985, Scientists can’t do science alone, they need publics.” Public Understanding of Science (May 25).
doi:10.1177/0963662516650361.
Gross, Alan. 1994. “The roles of rhetoric in the public understanding of science.” Public Understanding of Science 3, no. 1
( January): 3–23. doi:10.1088/0963-6625/3/1/001.
Hicks, Daniel. 2015. “Epistemological Depth in a GM Crops Controversy.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences. doi:10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.02.002.
Hicks, Daniel, and Roberta Millstein. 2016. “GM Crops: Non-Health Issues.” In Encyclopedia of Food and Agricultural Ethics,
edited by Paul Thompson and David Kaplan. Springer, July 28. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6167-4_545-1.
Holdren, John, Howard Shelanski, Darci Vetter, and Christy Goldfuss. 2015. Modernizing the Regulatory System for Biotechnology
Products. White House Oﬃce of Science and Technology Policy Memo, July 2. Accessed May 3, 2015. https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/modernizing_the_reg_system_for_biotech_products_memo_
final.pdf.
Howard, Don. 2009. “Better Red than Dead: Putting an End to the Social Irrelevance of Postwar Philosophy of Science.” Science
and Education 18, no. 2 (February): 199–220.
Hubbard, Kristina, and Neva Hassanein. 2012. “Confronting coexistence in the United States: organic agriculture, genetic
engineering, and the case of Roundup Ready® alfalfa.” Agriculture and Human Values 30, no. 3 (September): 325–35.
doi:10.1007/s10460-012-9394-6.
Irwin, Alan. 1995. Citizen Science: A Study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development. New York: Routledge.
James, Harvey, Mary Hendrickson, and Philip Howard. 2013. “Networks, Power and Dependency in the Agrifood Industry.” In
The Ethics and Economics of Agrifood Competition, edited by Harvey James, 99–126. Springer. doi:10.1007/978-94-007-
6274-9_6.
Jasanoﬀ, Sheila. 2005. Designs on nature: Science and democracy in Europe and the United States. Princeton University Press.
Johnson, Nathanael. 2014. “What I learned from six months of GMO research: None of it matters.” Grist. January 9. Accessed
January 14, 2014. http://grist.org/food/what-i-learned-from-six-months-of-gmo-research-none-of-it-matters/.
Kinchy, Abby, Daniel Lee Kleinman, and Robyn Autry. 2008. “Against Free Markets, Against Science? Regulating the Socio-
Economic Eﬀects of Biotechnology.” Rural Sociology 73, no. 2 ( June): 147–79. doi:10.1526/003601108784514570.
Kingsbury, David T., and Jerry D. Jennings. 1986. “Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology.” Federal Register 51,
no. 23302 ( June 18). Accessed May 3, 2016. https://www.aphis.usda.gov/brs/fedregister/coordinated_framework.pdf.
Kitcher, Philip. 2011a. Science in a Democratic Society. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books.
. 2011b. The Ethical Project. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
Kleinman, Daniel, and Abby Kinchy. 2003. “Why Ban Bovine Growth Hormone?: Science, Social Welfare, and the Divergent
Biotech Policy Landscapes in Europe and the United States.” Science as Culture 12, no. 3 (September): 375–414. doi:10.
1080/09505430309010.
Kleinman, Daniel, Abby Kinchy, and Robyn Autry. 2009. “Local variation or global convergence in agricultural biotechnology
policy?: A comparative analysis.” Science and Public Policy 36 (5): 361–71. doi:10.3152/030234209X442043.
Krimsky, Sheldon. 1982. Genetic Alchemy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
. 2015. “An Illusory Consensus behind GMO Health Assessment.” Science, Technology & Human Values 40, no. 6 (Novem-
ber): 883–914. doi:10.1177/0162243915598381.
Kuntz, Marcel. 2012. “The Postmodern Assault on Science.” EMBO Reports 13:885–89.
Lacey, Hugh. 1999. Is Science Value Free?: Values and Scientiﬁc Understanding. Routledge.
. 2002. “Assessing the Value of Transgenic Crops.” Science and Engineering Ethics 8 (4): 497–511. doi:10.1007/s11948-
002-0003-8.
. 2015. “‘Holding’ and ‘endorsing’ claims in the course of scientiﬁc activities.” Studies in the History and Philosophy of
Science 53 (October): 89–95. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.05.009.
Lacy, William. 2002. “Agricultural Biotechnology, Socioeconomic Issues, and the Fourth Criterion.” In Encyclopedia of Ethical,
Legal and Policy Issues in Biotechnology. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. doi:10.1002/0471250597.mur058.
Lang, John, Karen O’Neill, and William Hallman. 2003. “Expertise, Trust, and Communication about Food Biotechnology.”
AgBioForum 6 (4): 185–90.
Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lynas, Mark. 2015. “With G.M.O. Policies, Europe Turns Against Science.” New York Times (October 24). Accessed December 14,
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/opinion/sunday/with-gmo-policies-europe-turns-against-science.html.
Ma, Michelle. 2012. “Anticipating and Reducing the Unfairness of Monsanto’s Inadvertent Infringement Lawsuits: A Proposal
to Import Copyright Law’s Notice-and-Takedown Regime into the Seed Patent Context.” California Law Review 100, no.
3 ( June 10): 691–720. doi:10.15779/Z380Q52.
MacGilvray, Eric. 2013. “Democratic Doubts: Pragmatism and the Epistemic Defense of Democracy.” Journal of Political Philos-
ophy 22 (1): 105–23. doi:10.1111/jopp.12017.
Marco, Alan, and Gordon C. Rausser. 2008. “The Role of Patent Rights in Mergers: Consolidation in Plant Biotechnology.”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 90, no. 1 (February): 133–51. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01046.x.
McGloughlin, Martina. 1999. “Ten Reasons Why Biotechnology will be Important to the Developing World.” AgBioForum 2 (3
& 4): 163–74. Electronic version does not include page numbers, accessed May 1, 2014, http://agbioforum.org/v2n34/
v2n34a04-mcgloughlin.htm.
Daniel J. Hicks Genetically Modified Crops, Inclusion, and Democracy 27
McMichael, Philip. 2005. “Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime.” New Directions in the Sociology of Global
Development 11:265–99. doi:10.1016/S1057-1922(05)11010-5.
Meghani, Zahra. 2014. “Risk Assessment of Genetically Modiﬁed Food and Neoliberalism: An Argument for Democratizing
the Regulatory Review Protocol of the Food and Drug Administration.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics
27, no. 6 (December): 967–89. doi:10.1007/s10806-014-9511-1.
Meghani, Zahra, and Inmaculada de Melo-Martín. 2009. “The U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s Evaluation of the Safety
of Animal Clones: A Failure to Recognize the Normativity of Risk Assessment Projects.” Bulletin of Science, Technology &
Society 29, no. 1 (February): 9–17. doi:10.1177/0270467608329950.
Middendorf, Gerad, Mike Skladany, Elizabeth Ransom, and Lawrence Busch and. 1998. “New agricultural biotechnologies: The
struggle for democratic choice.” Monthly Review 50 ( July-August): 85–96.
Mill, John Stuart. (1859) 2008. On Liberty. Edited by Jonathan Bennett. Early Modern Texts. Accessed September 29, 2015.
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/mill1859.pdf.
Misak, Cheryl. 2000. Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation. New York: Routledge.
Misak, Cheryl, and Robert Talisse. 2014. “Debate: Pragmatist Epistemology and Democratic Theory: A Reply to Eric MacGilvray.”
Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (3): 366–76. doi:10.1111/jopp.12033.
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2016. Genetically Engineered Crops: Experiences and Prospects. The
National Academies Press. doi:10.17226/23395.
Nestle, Marion. 2010. Safe Food: Bacteria, Biotechnology, and Bioterrorism. Second edition. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Norton, Bryan. 2005. Sustainability: A philosophy of adaptive ecosystem management. University of Chicago Press.
Parthasarathy, Shobita. 2011. “Whose Knowledge? What Values? The Comparative Politics of Patenting Life Forms in the United
States and Europe.” Policy Sciences 44:267–88. doi:10.1007/s11077-011-9133-7.
Pearce, Warren, and Sujatha Raman. 2014. “The new randomised controlled trials (RCT) movement in public policy: Challenges
of epistemic governance.” Policy Sciences 47, no. 4 (December): 387–402. doi:10.1007/s11077-014-9208-3.
Rawls, John. 1993. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia.
Richardson, Henry. 2002. Democratic Autonomy. Oxford University Press.
Sagar, Ambuj, Arthur Daemmrich, and Mona Ashiya. 2000. “The Tragedy of the Commoners: Biotechnology and Its Publics.”
Nature Biotechnology 18 ( January): 2–4. doi:10.1038/71861.
Sappington, Thomas W., Kenneth R. Ostlie, Christina DiFonzo, Bruce E. Hibbard, Christian H. Krupke, Patrick Porter, Steven
Pueppke, Elson J. Shields, and Jon J. Tollefson. 2010. “Conducting public-sector research on commercialized transgenic
seed: In search of a paradigm that works.” GM Crops 1 (March/April): 1–4. doi:10.4161/gmcr.1.2.10833.
Sarewitz, Daniel. 2004. “How Science Makes Environmental Controversies Worse.” Environmental Science and Policy 7 (5): 385–
403. doi:10.1016/j.envsci.2004.06.001.
Shrader-Frechette, Kristin. 1991. Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Strategic Plan 2015-2019. 2015. Technical report. United States Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service.
Talisse, Robert. 2009. Democracy and Moral Conﬂict. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Impact of Genetically Engineered Crops on Farm Sustainability in the United States. 2010. Washington, DC: National Research
Council. Accessed December 11, 2011. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12804.
Thompson, Paul. 2014. “The GMO Quandary and What it Means for Social Philosophy.” Social Philosophy Today ( June 13).
doi:0.5840/socphiltoday201461210.
Thompson, Paul, and William Hannah. 2008. “Food and Agricultural Biotechnology: A Summary and Analysis of Ethical
Concerns.” Advances in Biochemical Engineering/Biotechnology 111:229–264. doi:10.1007/10_2008_100.
“Agriculture Biotechnology: A Look at Federal Regulation and Stakeholder Perspectives.” 2015. United States Senate. October 21.
Accessed December 14, 2015. http://www.ag.senate.gov/hearings/agriculture-biotechnology-a-look-at-federal-
regulation-and-stakeholder-perspectives.
“FDA’s Response to Public Comment on the Animal Cloning Risk Assessment, Risk Management Plan, and Guidance for In-
dustry.” 2008. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Version of record with actual publication date not available. Accessed
December 14, 2015. http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AnimalCloning/ucm055491.htm.
“Biotechnology Consultation Agency Response Letter BNF 000144.” 2015. U.S. Food and Drug Administration. May 27. Ac-
cessed December 14, 2015. http://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/GEPlants/Submissions/UCM451465.
Whitty, Christopher, Monty Jones, Alan Tollervey, and Tim Wheeler. 2013. “Africa and Asia Need a Rational Debate on GM
Crops.” Nature 497 (May 2): 31–3. doi:10.1038/497031a.
“Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.” 2016. World Trade Organization. Accessed January 21.
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/15sps_01_e.htm.
Wright, Susan. 1994.Molecular politics: Developing American and British regulatory policy for genetic engineering, 1972-1982. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Wynne, Brian. 1991. “Knowledges in Context.” Science, Technology, & Human Values 16, no. 1 ( January): 111–21.
Young, Iris Marion. 2000. Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford University Press.
